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Abstract
Despite the complex and bitter nature of the Maluku conﬂict, openings and
levers for sustainable peace exist. Finding strategic opportunities and leverage
points will beneﬁt from interpretation of a multi-dimensional “peacebuilding
map” that attempts synthesis of current best practices in conﬂict analysis. We be-
gin the process of mapmaking by establishing conﬂict transformation as the goal
in Maluku. A core tenet of conﬂict transformation is that social contexts—where
identities are fashioned and given value—remain mutable. Therefore, just as the
social identities of religion and ethnicity were politicized and polarized, so can
they be transformed and reconciled in fertile social spaces where mediative ca-
pacity is actively enhanced. The peacebuilding map will locate peacebuilding
actors, activities that tap into their inherent mediative capacity, and social spaces
where they are working and collaborating in Maluku. A temporal dimension is
incorporated in the map to ensure that peacebuilding activities are appropriately
suited to the situation in post-war Maluku. Finally, an analysis of current con-
ﬂict transformation strategies will suggest future prospects for peacebuilding in
Maluku.
1 Introduction
Not long ago, Maluku was a candidate for the world’s “most deadly
civil war” (Reilly, 2002). During the period 1999–2001, between
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5,000 and 10,000 lives were lost, and as many as 700,000 persons
were displaced (International Crisis Group, 2002). Today, vestiges
of normalcy have returned to Maluku: the state of emergency has
been lifted, a gubernatorial election has been held, the regional
university has reopened, and violent episodes are relatively rare.
These conditions offer potential footholds on a path to peace.
Even given certain footholds, however, Maluku’s path promises
to be slippery. It is widely observed that proximate consequences
of violent conﬂict—disrupted economies and social services, popu-
lation displacements, and heightened ﬁghting capacities—provide
fertile ground for relapse and deepening of conﬂict over time (Col-
lier, 2003, Kriesberg et al., 1989, Lederach, 2002). Perhaps the
greatest obstacle facing peace and reconciliation efforts in Maluku,
though, is the damage that has been done to social identities. Un-
der pressure, shared Maluccan and Indonesian identities unraveled
and were recast.1 Neighbors, co-workers, and friends who had
once together built and maintained a society that was frequently
touted as an example of Indonesia’s tolerance of diversity became
enemies—agents of threat, vengeance, and conspiracy. Religious
identity widely functioned to assign battle colors and provide calls
for violent action, rather than serve as framework for adherents’
practices of worship, fraternity, and charity (Winn, 2000).
Given this recent experience of trauma and polarization, how
can embittered enemies shed their combatant identities and be-
come neighbors, colleagues, and schoolmates once again? What
can be done to prevent violent conﬂict in Maluku from becoming
entrenched and endemic? How can peace gain traction before con-
ﬂict becomes intractable? We suggest that answers may be found
1It is widely argued that common Maluccan and Indonesian identities were tenuously
held together by New Order authoritarian enforcement of Pancasila and repression of
SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar golongan) topics. Even if it was of a “negative” variety,
it is also true that this relative peace created conditions in which marriages, institutional
memberships, and settlements brought together members of divergent ethnic and reli-
gious identities. Though largely overwhelmed during active conﬂict, such remnants of
cross-group understanding have worked to enable peacebuilding progress post-conﬂict,
as will be explored in detail later in this paper.
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by creating and analyzing a peacebuilding map for Maluku.
Recent conceptual innovations, taken from peacebuilding prac-
tice, now enable a complement to the well-established tool of con-
ﬂict mapping. Below, several of these innovations with high rele-
vance to social identity conﬂict will be described and synthesized
to create the conceptual foundation for a peacebuilding map. The
map developed will locate assets for conﬂict transformation, prin-
cipally civil society and governmental actors, as well as the tools,
actions, and qualities they employ to advance peacebuilding. The
paper’s ﬁnal sections will interpret the map’s features to suggest
strengths and weaknesses of current conﬂict transformation efforts
and to identify strategies for strengthening underdeveloped assets.
2 Conﬂict Mapping and its Proposed Complement
Better understanding a conﬂict requires the ability to fully describe
its origins, dimensions, and dynamics, including the factors that
sustain it. Various conﬂict analysis tools have been developed to
accomplish this. Among these, conﬂict mapping has several ad-
vantages.
The technique is well established, having been ﬁrst proposed
and named by Wehr (Wehr, 1979) and continuously adopted and
evolved by a host of users, including researchers, analysts, and in-
tervention agents working to resolve conﬂict. Today, conﬂict map-
ping is seen by many in the ﬁeld to represent best or standard
practice—as reﬂected in its acceptance by such international orga-
nizations as the United Nations Development Program, the De-
partment for International Development (UK), and various uni-
versities (Amsterdam, Bradford, Harvard, etc). Conﬂict mapping
is also increasingly being employed in Indonesia by members of
the Southeast Asian Conﬂict Studies Network, and academics, par-
ticularly those at Gadjah Mada and Duta Wacana universities. It is
also being increasingly pursued as a participatory process involv-
ing community members and Community Based Organizations
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(CBOs).2
Though some of these users do employ geographic mapping
(that is, locating phenomena spatially), generally speaking, con-
ﬂict maps are descriptive and conceptual documents, built on both
secondary and primary data. This data is typically compiled to
describe the conﬂict’s context, parties, causes and consequences,
contrasting beliefs, dynamics, goals and interests, functions, and
potential for regulation by internal or external actors (Wehr, 1998).
Those creating and analyzing these maps are usually conﬂict medi-
ators or parties to the conﬂict who seek clarity about the contours
of conﬂict.
The intent of the proposed peacebuilding map is to clarify how
the situation can be moved beyond conﬂict. It will attempt to illu-
minate this path by ﬁrst answering the following questions:
What is the goal of peacebuilding efforts?
Where does the conﬂict currently stand?
What broad strategies will push the situation from where it is
toward the deﬁned goal?
What are the most signiﬁcant roadblocks to peace?
Who are the actors that can move the process past these bar-
riers toward peace?
In which niches are these actors most effective?
What speciﬁc activities can these actors carry out in these
strategic spaces to build peace?
Bringing the Maluku experience together with recent conceptual
innovations in peace practice and theory will provide answers and
suggest a framework for analysis.
2For both theory and practice, participatory conﬂict mapping tends to borrow in-
spiration from Participatory Rural Appraisal, Participatory Action Research, and other
participatory approaches (Paffenholz, 2001).
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN MALUKU 139
3 Determining the Goal: Conﬂict Transformation
The assertion that peace can return to Maluku—as well as the cau-
tion that untangling conﬂict is inevitably arduous—derives from
the established theory and growing practice of conﬂict transforma-
tion (Kriesberg et al., 1989, Lederach, 1995, UNDP, 2000, Paffen-
holz, 2001, Ropers and GTZ, 2002, Satha-Anand, 2002). Several
characteristics recommend “conﬂict transformation” as the most
appropriate goal and peacebuilding framework for Maluku. Im-
portantly, its objectives are both immediate and long-term peace.
In the near term, conﬂict transformation is concerned with the
ending of hostilities. Yet, the absence of violence is merely the ab-
sence of conﬂict symptoms, often referred to as “negative” peace.
Unfortunately, the attention of governments, funders, and the me-
dia often wanes after this patina of peace appears. In the case of
Maluku, where deep damage has been done to social relationships
and institutions, efforts for peace must go further if some sem-
blance of the status quo ante is to be found.
Over the longer-term, conﬂict transformation also seeks to cre-
ate the underlying conditions for sustainable peace, such as cor-
recting power imbalances and depoliticizing social identities. Con-
ﬂict transformation aims to bring about a supportive environment
for peace, ending not only the effects, but also the root causes of
violent conﬂict. It is here, in stepping towards “positive” peace,
that conﬂict transformation differentiates itself from other peace-
building goals. Having clarity on a desired end state allows us to
ﬁx a goal for the peacebuilding map.
4 Where the Conﬂict Stands: Stages of Conﬂict
Two conceptual frameworks are associated with conﬂict transfor-
mation: the “contiguum model” and a staged peacebuilding time-
frame. Determining the current stage of the conﬂict will enable us
to identify the most critical assets in the peacebuilding map.
Meta-studies have noted that conﬂicts typically have linked,
yet observably distinct, stages. In the 1990s, theorists posited a
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staged conﬂict continuum. Along this somewhat predictable con-
tinuum, peacebuilding measures could be brought to bear on dif-
ferent strategic points (Ropers and GTZ, 2002). Further reﬂection
on this model revealed that stages were inter-related but did not
necessarily unfold in a linear progression. Conﬂict could recycle
through various stages depending on the success of peacebuilding
efforts and other contextual factors. Moreover, adding geographic
space as a further layer on the model demonstrated that the local-
ization of conﬂict could mean that various localities within a larger
jurisdiction (or across jurisdictions) were contending with differ-
ent stages of conﬂict at various times. Thus, the continuum model
is currently reframed as a contiguum. Along this contiguum Rop-
ers has distilled ﬁve phases: (1) latent conﬂict; (2) confrontation;
(3) violent conﬂict; (4) end of war; and (5) post-war peace consol-
idation (Ropers and GTZ, 2002).
Conﬂict in Maluku can currently be best described as falling
into phases 4 and 5. In phase 4, though termed “end of war”,
hostilities may still be sporadic under tenuously held peace agree-
ments. In phase 5, peacekeeping remains a priority while physical,
political, and psychosocial rebuilding are taking root.
5 Peacebuilding Efforts For to Post-Conﬂict Maluku
By employing the contiguum model, which is sensitive to the nu-
ances of temporal cycles and geographic space, we may attempt
to identify various peacebuilding efforts that are most appropri-
ate to the various conﬂict phase(s). Lederach suggests a series of
four peacebuilding stages that chieﬂy correspond to Roper’s con-
ﬂict phases 4 and 5. Within the conﬂict phase 4 “end of war”,
we ﬁnd two peacebuilding stages, (a) crisis management, and (b)
post-conﬂict preparedness. Meanwhile, conﬂict phase 5 connects
with peacebuilding stages (c) promoting structural stability and (d)
strengthening capacities and visions of the future. It is important
to note that the peacebuilding stages are deeply interrelated. Ef-
forts supportive of each stage should begin concurrently, come to
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Figure 1: Conﬂict Phases and Corresponding Peacebuilding Stages Ap-
plied to the Current Situation in Maluku
fruition sequentially, and depend on one another for success. The
following table combines these two conceptual frames to show
their inter-relationship.
In order to assist agents and institutions promoting conﬂict
transformation with the timing of their efforts, Lederach also links
these stages to a suggested activity and planning timeframe. While
the timeframe appears to relate to an “idealized”, unidirectional,
uni-layered unfolding of conﬂict, local conditions in Maluku must
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dictate the implementation of peacebuilding efforts. The primary
intent behind using this timeframe is to reﬂect the long-term view
required for conﬂict transformation processes to achieve positive
peace. As can be seen by the table above, a signiﬁcant portion of
the work of peacebuilding requires sustained effort with a time-
line extending from 3 to 20 years and beyond. These frameworks
provide a temporal guide for peacebuilding efforts.
Thus far, we have established that conﬂict transformation holds
advantages as an approach for peacebuilding in Maluku due to its
concern with lasting peace; that the undoing of conﬂict requires a
long-term view and commitment; and that we can identify peace-
building strategies to address conﬂict in its different phases. In
the next sections we will identify the central impediment to peace-
building in Maluku, the peacebuilding roles suited to social iden-
tity conﬂict, and the types of actors best positioned to accomplish
those roles.
6 Social Identity as the Central Challenge to Peacebuild-
ing in Maluku
Given the number of variables and layers to the Maluku conﬂict,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess all roles or actors that
should be brought to the service of peacebuilding. In what fol-
lows, then, our focus will sharpen to examine a central—if not the
central—facet of the Maluku conﬂict: social identity.
The conﬂict in Maluku is most frequently depicted as one of
conﬂicting religious or ethno-religious identities. Maluku is seen
to mimic a global pattern where social identity serves as the “fault
line” for conﬂict.3 Holding common currency, especially among
the media and many of the parties to conﬂict is a primordialist
explanation—asserting that different social identities (be they re-
3Indeed, the share of global violence relating to social identities (built on ethnic, re-
ligious, class, and other belongings or ascriptions), since the end of the Second World
War, has been staggering. Some estimates attribute half of all violent conﬂict from 1945–
1960, and seventy-ﬁve percent from 1960–1990, to intra-state social identity or cultural
conﬂict (Crawford, 1998).
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN MALUKU 143
ligious, ethnic, gender, etc.) must inherently conﬂict because they
are based on non-negotiable belongings and ascriptions.
However, a growing number of observers dismiss the social
identity argument in its primordialist guise as a red herring (Díez-
Medrano, 2002).. Their argument is persuasive. They begin by
pointing to the many instances globally where group identity dif-
ference does not produce conﬂict, or where it does so only very
rarely or non-violently. To determine what kind of role social iden-
tity may have, if any, multi-country meta-analyses have been per-
formed. These studies have tested for the extent to which social
identity difference is predictive of conﬂict and the extent to which
it is more or less statistically associable with conﬂict than other
variables such as economic growth, good governance, percent of
GDP spent on military expenditure, etc. (Reilly, 2002, Crawford
and Lipschutz, 1998). Findings have generally shown that the pri-
mary function played by social identity is transactional rather than
primordial. That is, religion, ethnicity, etc. serve as a coalescing
identity through which political and other interest-based organiz-
ing can take place. Frequently, identities are exploited for how they
serve as a basis for (re) distributions of power and resources.
While it has been shown that social identity cannot fully ex-
plain the conﬂict in Maluku, its role can hardly be overstated. In
Maluku, social identity has long inﬂuenced the parceling of politi-
cal and economic assets, by both state and non-state actors. Those
pursuing peacebuilding and hoping to restore intercultural rela-
tions must keep the legacies of this practice in mind. For example,
Dutch colonial authorities maintained a unique relationship with
Christian Maluccans that led the region to become a Christian en-
clave in predominantly Muslim Indonesia. In more recent years
Indonesian “afﬁrmative action” programs attempted to correct a
disparity in the provincial civil service.
“Political entrepreneurs” especially in post-colonial and mod-
ern settings comprise another group that has used culturally de-
ﬁned identities to attempt restructuring of economic, social, and
political relationships (Crawford, 1998). Political entrepreneur-
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ship recognizes that various social groups ﬁnd themselves relatively
privileged or disenfranchised by proximity to, and by favor with,
those in power (or with access to other assets). For example, preman
(gangs) and military political entrepreneurship added to Maluku’s
instability.
Whether primordial or transactional, social identity difference
clearly played a hugely powerful role in both sparking and fuel-
ing conﬂict. Economic, political, ecological and other factors were
undeniably prerequisites for conﬂict as well. Yet social identity—
especially religious identity—stirred emotion, provided shorthand
explanations, and offered easy labels in a singularly powerful way.
The conﬂict in Maluku quickly came to be framed as a sectarian
conﬂict, and over time took on religious identity as its prime en-
gine. While deconstructing multifactor causality clearly has a place
in peacebuilding, conﬂict transformation efforts must recognize
that the Maluccan conﬂict was most widely seen and felt as reli-
gious.
Peacebuilding efforts must also keep sight of a corollary point:
even as social identity drove conﬂict in Maluku, so did conﬂict
alter social identities. As conﬂict became pervasive and persistent,
it began to affect the range of activities, symbols, and institutions
of the conﬂicting parties. In such cases, Lederach (Lederach, 2002)
has observed that the conﬂict itself comes to partly deﬁne group
social identity. The segregated social spaces, the disintegration of
friendships and working relationships, and the disappearance of
festivities and rituals once shared by Muslim and Christian alike
are evidence of the power of conﬂict in Maluku to mutate social
identities, norms, and relationships. The more conﬂict takes root
in personal and group identities, the further conﬂict becomes self-
reproducing and intractable.
We have seen thus far that social identities can be transformed
for political purposes to induce conﬂict, and that conﬂict, in turn,
can transform identities. The remedy? As Kriesberg reminds us,
“even the non-negotiable core construct of social identity that ev-
ery individual and group brings to a conﬂict.is subject to change
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as social contexts change.Once [this] becomes known.it becomes
important to identify and cultivate the conditions of change from
intractable to tractable” (Kriesberg et al., 1989).
7 Social Spaces
Social identities and contexts are largely deﬁned in social spaces.
Lederach (Lederach, 2002) suggests that where it has been intense
or protracted, “conﬂict has created sharp.divisions, more often than
not along the lines of constructed and collective identities”. As
conﬂict pervades society, few institutions or points of interaction
between the conﬂicting parties are left untouched. Schools, busi-
nesses, housing, and transportation settings are all examples of so-
cial spaces typically colored by the conﬂict.
However, in select social spaces there still exists room for indi-
viduals of different identities to see past those facets of their identi-
ties that are in conﬂict. In these social spaces, conﬁdence building,
and even peacebuilding, can or could occur. What makes these
spaces unique? Typically, they evoke identities that are resilient to
conﬂict or more fundamental than those in conﬂict. For example,
in the events and contexts nurtured by the Baku Bae peace initia-
tive, culture (adat) was evoked as a commonality that transcended
religious ascription. People were reminded that they were Maluc-
can ﬁrst. Other social spaces where Maluccans have found com-
mon identity have included clinics and hospitals, soccer stadiums
and volleyball courts, marketplaces, workplaces, and schools. As
space is allowed for people to recall and live out a shared identity,
the facets of identity in conﬂict are pushed from the center to the
margins.
8 Actors, their Activities, and Advantages
Agents and institutions working to transform social identities and
contexts in conﬂict are principle forces for change in identity-based
conﬂict. We can locate these actors and their activities in our peace-
building map by the three societal “levels” at which they operate.
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Each level—designated “macro”, “meso”, and “micro”—provides
a unique niche for peace building (Lederach, 2002).
At the macro level one ﬁnds powerful, high visibility agents
and institutions. Examples are politicians, military leaders, inter-
national agencies, and, sometimes, religious leaders. Their ap-
proaches to peacebuilding frequently include high-level negotia-
tions and the employment of high status mediators. To their ad-
vantage, these actors and actions have the authority to effect insti-
tutional and systems changes. However, they are typically not en-
gaged at the grassroots levels and are often hamstrung from making
politically difﬁcult decisions by the expectations of their various
constituencies.
On the other end of the power and visibility spectrum are the
micro- or grassroots-level actors. In many ways, this is the es-
sential realm of conﬂict transformation, in contrast with conﬂict
management and conﬂict resolution. The inclusion of the grass-
roots in reconciliation recognizes that conﬂict has touched soci-
ety deeply—impacting identities and social spaces far beyond the
rariﬁed political space and select personas around the negotiation
table. Agents and institutions situated at the micro level include lo-
cal leaders, teachers, smaller NGOs, women’s organizations, and
local religious ﬁgures. The comparative advantages of these ac-
tors in peacebuilding rest on their understanding the local context
(how conﬂict has been framed locally) and locally appropriate re-
quirements for peace work. Activities include: the formation of
local peace coalitions; psychosocial healing work; local peace edu-
cation; and the general mobilization of local communities towards
peacebuilding. Working at this level, however, usually precludes
inﬂuence beyond the locality to build larger coalitions and take on
larger initiatives. The policies and other structural determinants
of the macro conﬂict setting are beyond the purview of the micro
level.
Lederach perceives a central role for the meso level in bridging
work between micro and macro. Typical agents and institutions at
this level include large NGOs, inﬂuential leaders in business, art,
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education, and faith communities, as well as the media. Because
meso actors have alliances and understandings at both micro and
macro levels, they often act to enable transactions across an oth-
erwise difﬁcult gulf separating different ontologies, understand-
ings of conﬂict, and notions of peacebuilding work. In concrete
terms, the peacebuilding work of meso level actors includes: con-
vening preliminary peace roundtables and negotiations; facilitating
peacebuilding training; and conducting monitoring of peace agree-
ments. Despite the ability to travel in both worlds, as it were, the
meso actors do not have authority at the macro level or the local
credibility or understanding to mobilize the grassroots.
9 Mediative Capacity as a Broadly Distributed Asset
The activities described above apply especially to organizations and
individuals whose social roles formally relate to conﬂict. Beyond
these more formal, and typically more visible and powerful, actors
and activities, peacebuilding strategies also need to support pre-
existing, under-supported assets of peacebuilding. A sociological
or anthropological approach is often helpful in eliciting and locat-
ing these assets. The most important assets are often members of
conﬂicting groups who possess a high degree of real or latent “me-
diative capacity”.
The invented term mediative capacity was born of the recogni-
tion that mediators are able to create a “quality of relationship” and
interaction around the mediation table that helps parties be open
to change, risk taking, and compromise. This quality of interaction
can be termed mediative. Those tools, skills, and understandings a
mediator uses in creating the mediative interactions represent her
mediative capacity (Lederach, 2002).
An oft-cited example of mediative capacity is that of the women
of Somalia who, usually outside of any organized effort, performed
informal diplomacy, even as their clans were wracked by violent
conﬂict. Because of their particular positions within and across
groups, and their roles within the larger society, these women were
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uniquely able to contribute to peacebuilding. The custom of cross-
clan marriages led women to generally oppose violence that pitted
their sons against their brothers, and it allowed them to travel in
relative safety between the social spaces of the clans themselves—
where they played a role in advocating negotiations and bringing
about ceaseﬁres. Additionally, women’s societal role as manag-
ing market life and ﬁnances—a function that went on even when
other institutions broke down—ensured their contact with mem-
bers of other clans in the social space of markets. There, they saw
each other as mothers, small business people, and maintainers of
the family economy and survival. These identities transcended the
conﬂicting identities of rival clan member (Lederach, 2002).
In Maluku, many parallel examples of natural peacemakers also
exist. Bapak Raja and other adat leaders have received some at-
tention in this regard. However, other groups, whose meditative
efforts might successfully be bolstered, have worked less visibly.
Women and health workers are two such groups who will be pro-
ﬁled in some detail below.
10 A Peacebuilding Map for Actor Identiﬁcation
The previous sections have proﬁled essential elements for identity-
based conﬂict transformation based on recent theoretical and prac-
tice in the ﬁeld of peacebuilding. By linking these elements and
conditions of change, a cohesive strategy for peacebuilding is pro-
posed: In strategic social spaces and moments, the peacebuilding
activities and capacities of select actors, operating at various societal
levels, can transform conﬂict. The following sections will suggest
concrete ways to employ this strategic framework.
The ﬁrst step in operationalizing the peacebuilding map is to
transform the strategic framework into a matrix for analysis. Lo-
cating peacebuilding agents and institutions is the primary concern
of this matrix. Yet, like a conﬂict map, the peacebuilding map aims
to be highly descriptive and links actors to other conditions for
change.
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Some conﬂict mapping efforts have begun to move in a sim-
ilar direction. Lederach (Lederach, 1997) has suggested an assets
inventory that locates actors, especially in relationship to one an-
other, and the structures that provide the context for conﬂict. The
present conﬂict map will attempt to add utility for peacebuilding
planners by taking Lederach’s mapping framework a step or two
further. First, the aspect of social spaces will be added, locating the
activities of peacebuilding actors in Maluku’s social context. Then
the activities of these actors will be categorized by the peacebuild-
ing stages they address.
Two examples of Maluku peacebuilding actors, Gerakan Perem-
puan Peduli (Concerned Women’s Movement) and Kesehatan Se-
bagai Jembatan Perdamaian (Health as a Bridge for Peace), will be
given here to demonstrate application of this matrix. These two
cases were selected to highlight the use of often underutilized so-
cietal assets for peacebuilding (women and health workers) and the
strategic position of meso-level actors in effecting change.
Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (GPP) was formed in August, 1999
by Sister Francesco Moens and other women leaders from the
Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant communities. While its mem-
bership comprised of local clergy and other women might sug-
gest the organization operates predominantly at the micro level,
very high level women have been among the ranks too, includ-
ing the then Vice Governor, Mrs. Paula Renyaan-Bataona. This
meso placement has allowed GPP to carry out a range of innova-
tive peacebuilding activities from psychosocial work with women
and children traumatized by warfare to meetings with the Gover-
nor and Regional Military Commander. Not only have their ac-
tivities transcended various social contexts, but they also have run
temporally from the height of hostilities through to reconciliation
in the ﬁnal phases of conﬂict and post-conﬂict—a critical long-
term approach for addressing the ruptures of religious strife. As in
Somalia and elsewhere, women in Maluku have again shown that
they are effective, entrepreneurial peacebuilders and an inherent
conﬂict transformation asset worthy of support.
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Social Spaces Strategic Role
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Figure 2: Peacebuilding Map Excerpt: Gerakan Perempuan Peduli
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Social Spaces Strategic Role
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Figure 3: Peacebuilding Map Excerpt: Kesehatan Sebagai Jembatan Per-
damaian
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Another social group that has been recognized as having inher-
ent mediative capacity and access to strategic social spaces is that
of health workers. The World Health Organization (WHO) has
recognized that not only do health and medical personnel have a
respected role in conﬂict (typically excepted from violence), but
that their perceived impartiality as healers and the universal need
for health care equips them well for bridging work in post-conﬂict
peacebuilding. While the Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP) cur-
riculum has been developed by WHO based on global experience,
in Maluku training was implemented by Gadjah Mada University
(UGM) and the Department of Health (DepKes), and the work
was carried out on the ground by local clinical and public health
workers. This diversiﬁed support allowed HBP to function as a
meso actor, mediating between communities and patients at the
grassroots and national and international bureaucracies. Like GPP,
the efﬁcacy of HBP in peacebuilding across social space and con-
ﬂict times owes largely to the mediative capacity and social niche
of health workers.
11 Interpreting the Peacebuilding Map
The value of these multi-dimensional peace assets depends on the
level of analysis. Locating peacebuilding agents and institutions
and identifying their activities is a ﬁrst level of value. Peacebuild-
ing planners should create and maintain an exhaustive inventory to
ﬁnd gaps and redundancies in efforts. Funders and other decision
makers using such inventories can better direct scarce resources.
By analyzing social levels of operation, timing, and modes of
interaction using the proposed dimensions of the matrix, this as-
sessment becomes more reﬁned, and oft overlooked levers for con-
ﬂict transformation can be identiﬁed and supported. New insights
about strengths and weaknesses of the range of peacebuilding ef-
forts operating at any given time can also be elicited by analyzing
multi-dimensional matrices for every peacebuilding actor identi-
ﬁed by an inventory.
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In an attempt to unearth new insights about peacebuilding in
Maluku, this author has analyzed approximately 10 peacebuilding
agents and institutions seen to be representative of the ﬁeld.4 For
reasons of space these could not all be presented in matrix form
here. However, an analysis of these matrices has yielded the fol-
lowing set of observations. Observations generally fall into two
groupings: (1) sub-strategies that are vibrant and maximized; and
(2) sub-strategies that may have potential to be further maximized.
11.1 Vibrant and Maximized Sub-Strategies
Conﬂict Dissention
A key approach for transforming identity conﬂict is the role of dis-
senters (primarily an endogenous initiative). When a subset of one
or both conﬂicting parties is able to carry on cooperative or con-
ciliatory relationships with the other, this can work to redescribe
group value identities and norms for group relations (Northrup,
1989). This has been one of the most actively pursued strategies in
Maluku. Among the examples:
Baku Bae;
pan-religious peace marches;
Health as a Bridge for Peace;
efforts of Mercy Corps and other NGOs to insist that staff,
training, grant reviews, etc. all have participation from both
Christian and
Islamic communities.
4Judith Large (Large, 2001) has noted that 112 new NGOs were recently created over
the course of a single year on Ambon island alone.
154 CAKALELE, VOL. 11
Superordinating a Shared Identity
A positive counterweight for the failure of state intervention in
Maluku, was a renewed reliance on local institutions (i.e., the rajas
with Sultan of Yogyakarta). Though not a goal, the effect of reviv-
ing local institutions has been to superordinate Maluccan identity
over (subordinated) Christian and Muslim identities (Northrup,
1989).
11.2 Sub-Strategies that Might be Further Maximized
Depoliticizing Social Identity Through Structural Change
In one meta-study of social identity, entitled The Myth of “Ethnic
Conﬂict”, Crawford et al suggest the following explanation: (1)
identity-based conﬂict becomes intensiﬁed (violent) when iden-
tities are politicized; (2) the extent to which politicization is rele-
vant over time depends on “rules of political membership” (voting
rights, civil service hiring practices, citizenship qualiﬁcations, etc.)
and structures and norms of asset allocation; and (3) strong insti-
tutions can be designed to channel conﬂict in non-violent ways
or otherwise mitigate tendencies for conﬂict (Crawford and Lip-
schutz, 1998).
Recasting Identity Linked Behavior
State power, especially state power perceived as non-biased, to es-
tablish the rule of law is a critical transformative step. As long
as vigilantism and militia warfare is seen as just self-defense and
not prevented or prosecuted, individuals and groups will maintain
their identities as defenders. If the rule of law was strengthened
and attacks and counterattacks were prosecuted as criminal, iden-
tities can be shifted (Northrup, 1989). Caution, of course, must be
employed here as there is the risk that criminal prosecution might
only inﬂame tensions—especially if they are perceived as biased.
Advocates of truth and reconciliation processes would argue that
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that process is more transformative and that amnesty is a prereq-
uisite to lasting peace. The more difﬁcult issue in operationalizing
the recommendation may in fact be that the central government
is unable to establish rule of law because of the weakness of state
structures.
12 Conclusion
Peacebuilding maps are an excellent technique for conﬂict trans-
formation efforts. A body of peacebuilding theory and practice has
provided the conceptual planks to gird this innovation. The peace-
building matrix suggested in this paper is a functional application.
In the Maluku case it has been shown that the mapping of
peacebuilding assets can reveal opportunities for coordination and
needs for resource allocation. Using a series of representative ma-
trices for analysis has suggested two well-used strategies for ad-
vancing peace, namely dissent from conﬂict participation by in-
ﬂuential actors and the superordinating of Maluccan identity over
that of polarized social sub-groups. Supporting such successful
approaches, as well as those still in need of development—such as
further attempting to depoliticize identity in the civil service and
other positions of power and enhancing the rule of law—can offer
important anchor points on the path to peace in Maluku. How-
ever, parliamentary and presidential elections in coming months
will offer serious tests. Assessing whether Maluku is clearly mak-
ing progress towards conﬂict transformation, or whether a nega-
tive peace slips back into conﬂict will have to wait until after these
elections.
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